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Abstract
Effective problem solving among multiple
agents requires a better understanding of the
role of communication in collaboration. In
this paper we show that there are commu-
nicative strategies that greatly improve the
performance of resource-bounded agents, but
that these strategies are highly sensitive to the
task requirements, situation parameters and
agents’ resource limitations. We base our ar-
gument on two sources of evidence: (1) an
analysis of a corpus of 55 problem solving
dialogues, and (2) experimental simulations
of collaborative problem solving dialogues in
an experimental world, Design-World, where
we parameterize task requirements, agents’ re-
sources and communicative strategies.
1 Introduction
A common assumption in work on collaborative prob-
lem solving is that interaction should be efficient.
When language is the mode of interaction, the mea-
sure of efficiency has been, in the main, the num-
ber of utterances required to complete the dialogue
[Chapanis et al., 1972]. One problem with this effi-
ciency measure is that it ignores the cognitive effort re-
quired by resource limited agents in collaborative prob-
lem solving. Another problem is that an utterance-
based efficiency measure shows no sensitivity to the re-
quired quality and robustness of the problem solution.
Cognitive effort is involved in processes such as mak-
ing inferences and swapping items from long term mem-
ory into working memory. When agents have limited
working memory, then only a limited number of items
can be salient, i.e. accessible in working memory.
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Since other processes, e.g. inference, operate on salient
items, an inference process may require the cognitive
effort involved with retrieving items from long term
memory, in addition to the effort involved with rea-
soning itself.
The required quality and robustness of the prob-
lem solution often determines exactly how much cog-
nitive effort is required. This means that a resource-
limited agent may do well on some tasks but not on oth-
ers [Norman and Bobrow, 1975]. For example, consider
constraint-based tasks where it is difficult for an agent
to simultaneously keep all the constraints in mind,
or inference-based tasks that require a long deductive
chain or the retrieval of multiple premises, where an
agent may not be able to simultaneously access all of
the required premises.
Furthermore, contrary to the efficiency hypothesis,
analyses of problem-solving dialogues shows that hu-
man agents in dialogue engage in apparently ineffi-
cient conversational behavior. For example, naturally-
occurring dialogues often include utterances that realize
facts that are already mutually believed, or that would
be mutually believed if agents were logically omniscient
[Pollack et al., 1982, Finin et al., 1986, Walker, 1993].
Consider 1-26a, which repeats information given in 1-20
. . . 1-23:
(1) (20) H: Right. The maximum amount of credit that
you will be able to get will be 400 that they will be
able to get will be 400 dollars on their tax return
(21) C: 400 dollars for the whole year?
(22) H: Yeah it’ll be 20%
(23) C: um hm
(24) H: Now if indeed they pay the $2000 to your wife,
that’s great.
(25) C: um hm
(26a) H: SO WE HAVE 400 DOLLARS.
(26b) Now as far as you are concerned, that could
cost you more.....
Utterances such as 1-26a, that repeat, paraphrase or
make inferences explicit, are collectively called infor-
mationally redundant utterances, IRUs. In 1,
the utterances that originally added the belief that they
will get 400 dollars to the context are in italics and the
IRU is given in CAPS.
About 12% of the utterances in a corpus of
55 naturally-occurring problem-solving dialogues were
IRUs [Walker, 1993], but the occurrence of IRUs con-
tradicts fundamental assumptions of many theories of
communication [Allen and Perrault, 1980], inter alia.
The hypothesis that is investigated in this paper is that
IRUs such as 1-26a are related to agents’ limited atten-
tional and inferential capacity and reflect the fact that
beliefs must be salient to be used in deliberation and
inference.1 Hence apparently redundant information
serves an important cognitive function.
In order to test the hypothesized relationship of
communicative strategies to agents’ resource limits we
developed a test-bed environment, Design-World, in
which we vary task requirements, agents’ resources
and communicative strategies. Our artificial agents
are based on a cognitive model of attention and mem-
ory. Our experimental results show that communica-
tive strategies that incorporate IRUs can help resource-
limited cognitive agents coordinate, limit processing,
and improve the quality and robustness of the prob-
lem solution. We will show that the task determines
whether a communicative strategy is beneficial, de-
pending on how the task is defined in terms of fault
intolerance and the level of belief coordination required.
2 Design-World Task and Agent
Architecture
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Figure 1: Potential Final State for Design-World Task:
A Collaborative Plan Achieved by the Dialogue
The Design-World task consists of two agents who
1The type of IRU in 1-26a represents the Attention class
of IRUs; Attitude and Consequence IRUs are discussed else-
where [Walker, 1992, Walker, 1993].
carry out a dialogue in order to come to an agree-
ment on a furniture layout design for a two room house
[Whittaker et al., 1993]. Figure 1 shows a potential fi-
nal plan constructed as a result of a dialogue. The
agents’ shared intention is to design the house, which
requires two subparts of designing room-1 (the study)
and designing room-2 (the living room). A room design
consists of four intentions to put a furniture item into
the room. Each furniture item has a color and point
value, which provides the basis for calculating the util-
ity of a put-act involving that furniture item. Agents
start with private beliefs about the furniture items they
have and their colors. Beliefs about which furniture
items exist and how many points they are worth are
mutual.
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Figure 2: Design-World version of the IRMA Agent Ar-
chitecture for Resource-Bounded Agents with Limited
Attention (AWM)
The agent architecture for deliberation and means-
end reasoning is based on the IRMA architecture, also
used in the Tile-
World simulation environment [Bratman et al., 1988,
Pollack and Ringuette, 1990], with the addition of a
model of limited Attention/Working memory, AWM.
See figure 2.
The Attention/Working Memory model, AWM, is
adapted from [Landauer, 1975]. While the AWMmodel
is extremely simple, Landauer showed that it could be
parameterized to fit many empirical results on human
memory and learning [Baddeley, 1986]. AWM consists
of a three dimensional space in which propositions ac-
quired from perceiving the world are stored in chrono-
logical sequence according to the location of a moving
memory pointer. The sequence of memory loci used
for storage constitutes a random walk through memory
with each loci a short distance from the previous one.
If items are encountered multiple times, they are stored
multiple times [Hintzmann and Block, 1971].
When an agent retrieves items from memory, search
starts from the current pointer location and spreads
out in a spherical fashion. Search is restricted to a
particular search radius: radius is defined in Hamming
distance. For example if the current memory pointer
loci is (0 0 0), the loci distance 1 away would be (0 1
0) (0 -1 0) (0 0 1) (0 0 -1) (-1 0 0) (1 0 0). The actual
locations are calculated modulo the memory size. The
limit on the search radius defines the capacity of atten-
tion/working memory and hence defines which stored
beliefs and intentions are salient.
The radius of the search sphere in the AWM model
is used as the parameter for Design-World agents’
resource-bound on attentional capacity. In the exper-
iments below, memory is 16x16x16 and the radius pa-
rameter varies between 1 and 16, where AWM of 1 gives
severely attention limited agents and AWM of 16 means
that everything an agent knows is salient.
The advantages of the AWM model is that it was
shown to reproduce, in simulation, many results on
human memory and learning. Because search starts
from the current pointer location, items that have been
stored most recently are more likely to be retrieved, pre-
dicting recency effects [Baddeley, 1986]. Because items
that are stored in multiple locations are more likely
to be retrieved, the model predicts frequency effects
[Landauer, 1975]. Because items are stored in chrono-
logical sequence, the model produces natural associa-
tivity effects [Anderson and Bower, 1973]. Because de-
liberation and means-end reasoning can only operate
on salient beliefs, limited attention produces a con-
comitant inferential limitation, i.e. if a belief is not
salient it cannot be used in deliberation or means-end-
reasoning. This means that mistakes that agents make
in their planning process have a plausible cognitive ba-
sis. Agents can both fail to access a belief that would
allow them to produce an optimal plan, as well as make
a mistake in planning if a belief about how the world
has changed as a result of planning is not salient.
3 Design-World Communicative
Strategies
A communicative strategy is a strategy for commu-
nicating with another agent, which varies according to
the agents’ initiative, amount of information about the
task, degree of resource-bounds, and communication
style [Walker and Whittaker, 1990, Carletta, 1992,
Cawsey et al., 1992, Guinn, 1993]. Design-World
agents communicate with an artificial language whose
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Figure 3: Discourse Actions for the Design-World Task
primitive communicative acts are propose, accept,
reject, say. These primitive acts can be composed to
produce higher level discourse acts such as proposals,
acceptances, rejections, openings and closings
[Walker, 1993]. See figure 3.
A discourse act may be left implicit, or may be var-
ied to consist of one or more communicative acts. Dis-
course acts are different from actions on the environ-
ment because they are actions whose intended effect is
a change in the other agent’s mental state. Because
the other agent is an active intelligence, it is possible
for it to supplement an underspecified discourse action
with its own processing. The variation in the degree
of explicitness of a discourse act is the basis of agents’
communicative strategies. Here we will compare three
communicative strategies: (1) All-Implicit; (2) Close-
Consequence; and (3) Explicit-Warrant.
The All-Implicit strategy is a ‘bare bones’ strategy,
exemplified by the partial dialogue in 2. In 2 each ut-
terance is shown both as a gloss in italics, and in the
artificial language that the agents communicate with.
(2) 1: BILL: Then, let’s put the green rug in the study.
(propose agent-bill agent-kim option-43: put-act
(agent-bill green rug room-1))
2: KIM: Then, let’s put the green lamp in the study.
(propose agent-kim agent-bill option-61: put-act
(agent-kim green lamp room-1))
3: BILL: No, instead let’s put the green couch in the
study.
(reject agent-bill agent-kim option-75: put-act
(agent-bill green couch room-1))
.....
In Design-World, unlike TileWorld, an option that is
generated via means-end reasoning or from proposals
of other agents only becomes an intention if it is ac-
cepted by both agents. See figure 3. In dialogue 2,
Bill makes a proposal in 1, and then Kim implicitly ac-
cepts this proposal with a new proposal in 2. In 2-3 Bill
rejects Kim’s proposal and makes a counter-proposal.
The content of communicative acts are beliefs and
(potential) intentions. Dialogue 2 illustrates part of
the cycle for achieving a design-house plan: (1) indi-
vidual agents means-end reason about options in the
domain; (2) individual agents deliberate about which
options are preferable; (3) then agents make propos-
als to other agents, based on the options identified in a
reasoning cycle, about actions that contribute to the
satisfaction of their intentions; (4) then these propos-
als are accepted or rejected by the other agent, or
acceptance/rejection is postponed by asking for more
information. See figure 2. Deliberating whether to ac-
cept or reject a proposal is based on beliefs about the
proposed action’s utility [Doyle, 1992].
Agents parameterized with the All-Implicit strategy
do not include IRUs in any discourse act or produce any
discourse acts labelled as potentially implicit in figure
3. Agents parameterized with the Close-Consequence
and Explicit-Warrant strategies include IRUs at dia-
logue segment closings and in proposals.
In dialogue 3 agent CLC uses the Close-Consequence
strategy. CLCmakes explicit closing statements, such
as 3-2, on the completion of the intention associated
with a discourse segment. CLC’s closing discourse
act also includes IRUs as in 3-3; CLC makes the infer-
ence explicit that since they have agreed on putting the
green rug in the study, Bill no longer has the green rug
(act-effect inference).
(3) 1: BILL: Then, let’s put the green rug in the study.
(propose agent-bill agent-clc option-30: put-act
(agent-bill green rug room-1))
2: CLC: So, we’ve agreed to put the green rug in the
study.
(close agent-clc agent-bill intended-30: put-act
(agent-bill green rug room-1))
3: CLC: agent-bill doesn’t have green rug.
(say agent-clc agent-bill bel-48: has n’t (agent-bill
green rug))
The Close-Consequence strategy of making infer-
ences explicit at the close of a segment is intended to
parallel the naturally occurring example in 1. In both
cases an inference is made explicit that follows from
what has just been said, and the inference is sequen-
tially located at the close of a discourse segment.
The Explicit-Warrant strategy varies the proposal
discourse act by including warrant IRUs in each pro-
posal. In general a warrant for an intention is a rea-
son for adopting the intention, and here warrants are
the score propositions that give the utility of the pro-
posal, which are mutually believed at the outset of the
dialogues. In 4, the warrant IRU is in caps.
(4) 1: IEI: Putting in the green rug is worth 56
(say agent-iei agent-iei2 bel-265: score (option-202:
put-act (agent-bill green rug room-1) 56))
2: IEI: Then, let’s put the green rug in the study.
(propose agent-iei agent-iei2 option-202: put-act
(agent-bill green rug room-1))
Since warrants are used by the other agent in deliber-
ation, the Explicit-Warrant strategy can save the other
agent the processing involved with determining which
facts are relevant for deliberation and retrieving them
from memory. The Explicit-Warrant strategy also oc-
curs in natural dialogues [Walker, 1993].
4 Design World Task Variations
Design-World supports the parameterization of the task
so that it can be made more difficult to perform by mak-
ing greater processing demands on the agents. These
task variations will be shown to interact with variations
in communicative strategies and attentional capacity in
section 5.
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Figure 4: Evaluating Task Invalids: for some tasks in-
valid steps invalidate the whole plan.
Standard Task
The Standard task is defined so that the raw score
that agents achieve for a design-house plan, con-
structed via the dialogue, is the sum of all the furniture
items for each valid step in their plan. The point values
for invalid steps in the plan are simply subtracted from
the score so that agents are not heavily penalized for
making mistakes.
Zero Invalids Task
The Zero-Invalids Task is a fault-intolerant version of
the task in which any invalid intention invalidates the
whole plan. In general, the effect of making a mistake
wW
w
W
w
W
w
W
P P P P
DESIGN ROOM-2
c c
SCORE(F,NUM)
c c
? ? ? ?
ii
i i i i
ii
,  
P = Intention to PUT(A,F,R,T)
W = belief that 
c = contributes relation
w = warrants relation
KEY: 
Figure 5: Tasks can differ as to the level of mutual
belief required. Some tasks require that the warrant
W, a reason for doing P, is mutually believed and others
don’t.
in a plan depends on how interdependent different sub-
parts of the problem solution are.2 Figure 4 shows the
choices for the effect of invalid steps for the Design-
World task. The score for invalid steps (mistakes) can
just be subtracted out; this is how the Standard task is
defined. Alternately, invalid steps can propagate up so
that an invalid put-act means that the Design-Room
plan is invalid. Finally, mistakes can completely propa-
gate so that the Design-House plan is invalid if one step
is invalid, as in the Zero-Invalids task.
Zero NonMatching Beliefs Task
The Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs task is designed to in-
vestigate the effect of the level of agreement that agents
must achieve. Figure 4 illustrates different degrees of
agreeing in a collaborative task, e.g. agents may agree
on the actions to be done, but not agree on the reasons
for intending that action.3 The Zero-NonMatching-
Beliefs task is defined so that a warrant W, a reason
for doing P, must be mutually supposed.
5 Experimental Results
We wish to evaluate the relative benefits of the com-
municative strategies in various tasks for a range of
resource limits. In section 4 we defined an objective
performance measure for the design-house plan for
each task variation. We must also take cognitive costs
into account. Because cognitive effort can vary accord-
ing to the communication situation and the agent ar-
chitecture, performance evaluation introduces three ad-
ditional parameters: (1) commcost: cost of sending a
message; (2) infcost: cost of inference; and (3) ret-
cost: cost of retrieval from memory:
2Contrast aircraft scheduling with furnishing a room.
3Consider a union/ management negotiation where each
party has different reasons for any agreement.
cost - clc-kim bill-kim C= 1 , I = 1 , R = 0.01
Attention/Working Memory
CO
MP
OS
ITE
 Sc
ore
 Di
ffe
ren
ce
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-
20
0
-
10
0
0
10
0
20
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 6: Close-Consequence can be detrimental in the
Standard Task. Strategy 1 is the combination of an
All-Implicit agent with a Close-Consequence agent and
Strategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents, Task = Standard,
commcost = 1, infcost = 1, retcost = .01
performance =
Task Defined raw score
– (commcost × total messages)
– (infcost × total inferences)
– (retcost × total retrievals)
We simulate 100 dialogues at each parameter setting
and calculate the normalized performance distributions
for each sample run. In the results to follow, comm-
cost, infcost and retcost are fixed at 1,1, .01 re-
spectively, and the parameters that are varied are (1)
communication strategy; (2) task definition; and (3)
AWM settings.4 Differences in the performance distri-
butions for each set of parameters are evaluated for sig-
nificance over the 100 dialogues using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) two sample test [Siegel, 1956].
A strategy A is defined to be beneficial as com-
pared to a strategy B, for a set of fixed parameter
settings, if the difference in distributions using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample test is significant at p
< .05, in the positive direction, for two or more AWM
settings. A strategy is detrimental if the differences
go in the negative direction. Strategies may be neither
beneficial or detrimental, since there may be no
difference between two strategies.
4See [Walker, 1993, Walker, 1995] for results related
to varying the relative cost of retrieval, inference and
communication.
A difference plot such as that in figure 6 will be
used to summarize a comparison of strategy 1 and strat-
egy 2. In the comparisons below, strategy 1 is either
Close-Consequence or Explicit-Warrant and strategy 2
is the All-Implicit strategy. Differences in perfor-
mance between two strategies are plotted on the Y-axis
against AWM parameter settings on the X-axis. Each
point in the plot represents the difference in the means
of 100 runs of each strategy at a particular AWM set-
ting. These plots summarize the information from 18
performance distributions (1800 simulated dialogues).
Every simulation run varies the AWM radius from 1 to
16 to test whether a strategy only has an effect at par-
ticular AWM settings. If the plot is above the dotted
line for 2 or more AWM settings, then strategy 1 may
be beneficial, depending on whether the differences
are significant.5
In the reminder of this section, we first compare
within strategy, for each task definition and show that
whether or not a strategy is beneficial depends on the
task. Then we compare across strategies for a partic-
ular task, showing that the interaction of the strategy
and task varies according to the strategy. The compar-
isons will show that what counts as a good collaborative
strategy depends on cognitive limits on attention and
the definition of success for the task.
5.1 Close Consequence
The difference plot in figure 6 shows that Close-
Consequence is detrimental in the Standard task at
AWM of 1 . . . 5 (KS > 0.19, p < .05).
In contrast, if the task is the fault-intolerant Zero-
Invalids task, then the Close-Consequence strategy is
beneficial. Figure 7 demonstrates that strategies
which include Consequence IRUs can increase the ro-
bustness of the planning process by decreasing the fre-
quency with which agents make mistakes (KS for AWM
of 3 to 6 > .19, p < .05). This is a direct result of re-
hearsing the act-effect inferences, making it unlikely
that attention-limited agents will forget that they have
already used a furniture item.
Figure 8 shows that the Close-Consequence strategy
is detrimental when the task requires agents to achieve
matching beliefs on the warrants for their intentions
(KS 1,3) > 0.3, p < .01). This is because IRUs dis-
place other facts from AWM. In this case agents for-
get the scores of furniture pieces under consideration,
which are the warrants for their intentions. Thus here,
as elsewhere, we see that IRUs can be detrimental by
making agents forget critical information.
5Visual difference in means and distributional differences
need not be correlated, however KS significance values will
be given with each figure, and difference plots are much
more concise than actual distributions.
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Figure 7: Close Consequence is beneficial for Zero-
Invalids Task. Strategy 1 is the combination of an
All-Implicit agent with a Close-Consequence agent and
Strategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents, Task = Zero-
Invalid, commcost = 1, infcost = 1, retcost = .01
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Figure 8: Close-Consequence is detrimental for Zero-
Nonmatching-Beliefs Task. Strategy 1 is the combina-
tion of an All-Implicit agent with a Close-Consequence
agent and Strategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents, Task =
Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs, commcost = 1, infcost = 1,
retcost = .01
5.2 Explicit Warrant
Figure 9 shows that Explicit-Warrant is beneficial in the
Standard task at AWM values of 3 and above. Here,
the scores improve because the beliefs necessary for de-
liberating the proposal are made available in the cur-
rent context with each proposal (KS for AWM of 3 and
above > .23, p < .01), so that agents don’t have to
search memory for them. At AWM parameter settings
of 16, where agents can search a huge belief space for
beliefs to be used as warrants, the saving in processing
time is substantial.
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Figure 9: Explicit-Warrant saves Retrieval costs: Strat-
egy 1 is two Explicit-Warrant agents and strategy 2 is
two All-Implicit agents: Task = Standard, commcost
= 1, infcost = 1, retcost = .01
When the task is Zero-Invalid (no figure due to
space), the benefits of the Explicit-Warrant strategy are
dampened from the benefits of the Standard task, be-
cause Explicit-Warrant does nothing to address the rea-
sons for agents making mistakes. In comparison with
the All-Implicit strategy, it is detrimental at AWM of
1 and 2, but is still beneficial at AWM of 5,6,7, and 11.
In contrast to Close-Consequence, the Explicit-
Warrant strategy is highly beneficial when the task is
Zero-NonMatching-Beliefs, see figure 10 (KS > .23 for
AWM from 2 to 11, p < .01). When agents must agree
on the warrants underlying their intentions, including
these warrants with proposals is a good strategy even
if the agent already knows the warrants. This is due
to agents’ resource limits, which means that retrieval is
indeterminate and that there are costs associated with
retrieving warrants from memory. At high AWM the
differences between the two strategies are small.
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Figure 10: Explicit-Warrant is beneficial for Zero-
NonMatching-Beliefs Task: Strategy 1 is two Explicit-
Warrant agents and strategy 2 is two All-Implicit
agents: Task = Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs, commcost
= 1, infcost = 1, retcost = .01
6 Related Work
Design-World was inspired by the TileWorld simu-
lation environment: a rapidly changing robot world
in which an artificial agent attempts to optimize
reasoning and planning [Pollack and Ringuette, 1990,
Hanks et al., 1993]. TileWorld is a single agent world in
which the agent interacts with its environment, rather
than with another agent. Design-World uses similar
methods to test a theory of the effect of resource limits
on communicative behavior between two agents.
The belief reasoning mechanism of Design-World
agents was informed by the theory of belief revision
and the multi-agent simulation environment developed
in the Automated Librarian project [Galliers, 1991,
Cawsey et al., 1992]. The communicative acts and dis-
course acts used by Design-World agents are similar
to those used in [Carletta, 1992, Cawsey et al., 1992,
Sidner, 1992, Stein and Thiel, 1993].
Design-World is also based on the method used in
Carletta’s JAM simulation for the Edinburgh Map-
Task [Carletta, 1992]. JAM is based on the Map-Task
Dialogue corpus, where the goal of the task is for the
planning agent, the instructor, to instruct the reactive
agent, the instructee, how to get from one place to an-
other on the map. JAM focuses on efficient strategies
for recovery from error and parametrizes agents accord-
ing to their communicative and error recovery strate-
gies. Given good error recovery strategies, Carletta ar-
gues that ‘high risk’ strategies are more efficient, where
efficiency is a measure of the number of utterances in
the dialogue. While the focus here is different, we have
shown that that the number of utterances is just one pa-
rameter for evaluating performance, and that the task
definition determines when strategies are effective.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we showed that collaborative communica-
tive behavior cannot be defined in the abstract: what
counts as collaborative depends on the task, and the
definition of success in the task. We used two empirical
methods to support our argument: corpus based anal-
ysis and experimentation in Design-World. The meth-
ods and the focus of this work are novel; previous work
on resource limited agents has not examined the role
of communicative strategies in multi-agent interaction
whereas work on communication has not considered the
effects of resource limits.
We showed that strategies that are inefficient un-
der assumptions of perfect reasoners with unlimited
attention and retrieval are effective with resource lim-
ited agents. Furthermore, different tasks make different
cognitive demands, and place different requirements on
agents’ collaborative behavior. Tasks which require a
high level of belief coordination can benefit from com-
municative strategies that include redundancy. Fault
intolerant tasks benefit from redundancy for rehearsing
the effects of actions.
Because the communicative strategies that we tested
were based on a corpus analysis of human human fi-
nancial advice dialogues and because variations in the
Design-World task were parametrized, we believe the
results presented here may be domain independent,
though clearly more research is needed.
Here we fixed the parameters for the cost of commu-
nication, inference and retrieval, only discussed a few
of the implemented discourse strategies, and didn’t dis-
cuss Design-World parameters that increase the infer-
ential complexity of the task and that limit inferential
processing. Elsewhere we show that: (1) when retrieval
is free or when communication cost is high, that the
Explicit-Warrant strategy is detrimental at low AWM
[Walker, 1993]; (2) some IRU strategies are only bene-
ficial when inferential complexity is higher than in the
Standard Task [?]; (3) IRUs that make inferences ex-
plicit can help inference limited agents perform as well
as logically omniscient ones [Walker, 1995].
One ramification of the results presented here is that
experimental environments for testing agent architec-
tures should support task variation
[Pollack and Ringuette, 1990, Hanks et al., 1993]. Fur-
thermore the task variation should test aspects of the
interaction of the agents involved. These results also in-
form the design of multi-agent problem solving systems
and for systems for teaching, advice and explanation.
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